The Frequency, Predictability, and Proportionality of Jury Awards of Punitive Damages in State Courts in 2005: A New Audit by Vidmar, Neil & Holman, Mirya
VIDMARHOLMAN_LEAD_FORMATTED_6952884.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 8/4/2010 8:37 AM 
 
The Frequency, Predictability, and Proportionality of Jury 
Awards of Punitive Damages in State Courts in 2005:                   
A New Audit 
Neil Vidmar & Mirya Holman1 
  
 The state of punitive damages in the United States has been a controversial 
topic for more than three decades, resulting in litigation reaching the U.S. 
Supreme Court and state supreme courts.  Various business advocacy groups 
have sought to drastically curb or eliminate punitive damages while plaintiffs’ 
lawyers and consumer groups vigorously defend the use of punitive damages.  
State legislatures have responded with many substantive and procedural 
reforms over the years.  Yet, in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker,2 the United States 
Supreme Court, while approvingly citing empirical evidence indicating that 
there are “not mass-produced runaway awards”3 and that “by most accounts the 
median ratio of punitive to compensatory awards has remained less than 1:1,”4 
once again expressed concerns about punitive awards exceeding a single-digit 
ratio to compensatory damages and the predictability of punitive awards.  A 
full understanding of the issues involved in the punitive damages controversy 
requires consideration of the causes of action, the magnitude of both 
compensatory and punitive claims, the ratios of these two outcomes, and a 
qualitative understanding of the nature of punitive awards.  This article presents 
a profile of punitive damages awarded by juries in 2005 using the U.S. Bureau 
of Justice Statistics’ Civil Justice Survey of State Courts.  We supplement the 
BJS survey with an additional sample of punitive damages claims from nine 
states in 2005.  This additional database provides more details about the 
disputes and procedural matters associated with the trials.  The data show that 
there are case-type patterns in the awarding of punitive damages that contradict 
claims about punitive awards, especially those involving product liability cases, 
and that the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages is a complex matter not 
                                                           
 1.  Vidmar is the Russell M. Robinson II Professor of Law and Professor of Psychology at Duke 
University.  Holman is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Florida Atlantic University.  The authors 
are indebted to Michael Quick for his excellent research assistance, to George Christie for comments on an 
earlier draft of this paper, and to Ted Eisenberg and the participants on a panel at the Conference on Empirical 
Legal Scholarship at the University of Southern California in 2009.  Finally, and especially, the authors are 
indebted to Michael Rustad for his insightful comments and encouragement.  
 2.  128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008). 
 3.  Id. at 2624 (surveying punitive damage literature). 
 4.  Id. at 2624 (describing relative evenness of damage awards). 
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easily resolved without consideration of the underlying factual bases of the 
claims. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Litigation involving punitive damages has been before the U.S. Supreme 
Court and various state supreme courts numerous times since the 1980s.5  
Central issues in the litigation have involved the relationship between punitive 
to compensatory damages, the purposes of punitive damages, and limitations on 
when, how, and why juries and judges might award punitive damages.  Various 
advocacy groups, including the American Tort Reform Association and the 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, have sought strict limits on the amounts that can 
be awarded for punitive damages, especially in product liability, premises 
liability, and similar lawsuits that involve businesses as defendants.  These 
groups argue that the threat of punitive damages stifles innovation and harms 
American businesses.6  In contrast, consumer groups and plaintiffs’ lawyers 
assert that punitive damages are necessary, because they are a method of 
deterring extraordinary negligence and compensating victims for social 
wrongs.7 
The Supreme Court, in opinions from Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. 
                                                           
 5.  See, e.g., Michael L. Rustad, The Closing of Punitive Damages’ Iron Cage, 38 LOY. L. REV. 1297 
(2005); Neil Vidmar & Matthew Wolfe, Punitive Damages, 5 ANN. REV. OF L. & SOC. SCI. 179 (2009); 
Developments:  The Paths of Civil Litigation, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1752 (2000).  
 6.  See, e.g., Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Petitioner, Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007) (No. 05-1256); Brief of Oregon 
Forest Industries Council & Oregon Grocers Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari, Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007) (No. 05-1256); Brief of the Product Liability 
Advisory Council, Inc., as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 
346 (2007) (No. 05-1256); Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as Amicus 
Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008) (No. 07-219); Brief of 
Washington Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. 
Ct. 2605 (2008) (No. 07-219); Brief of the Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc., as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Petitioners, Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008) (No. 07-219); Brief of the 
Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Pacific 
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991); Brief of the Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc., & the 
Business Roundtable et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 
U.S. 559 (1996) (No. 94-896); AM. TORT REFORM FOUND. JUDICIAL HELLHOLES 2009/2010 (2009); VICTOR E. 
SCHWARTZ & CARY SILVERMAN, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, 101 WAYS TO IMPROVE STATE 
LEGAL SYSTEMS:  A USER’S GUIDE TO PROMOTING FAIR AND EFFECTIVE CIVIL JUSTICE (2009). 
 7.  See, e.g., Brief of Federal Procedural Scholars as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Philip 
Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007) (No. 05-1256); Brief of Oregon Trial Lawyers Ass’n as Amicus 
Curiae Supporting Respondent, Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007) (No. 05-1256); Brief of 
Sociologists, Psychologists, and Law and Economics Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, 
Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008) (No. 07-219); Brief of the Ass’n of Trial Lawyers of 
America as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 
(2003) (No. 01-1289); Brief of Certain Leading Social Scientists and Legal Scholars as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Respondents, State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003) (No. 01-1289); 
CTR. FOR JUSTICE & DEMOCRACY, ENVIRONMENTAL TORT LAWSUITS:  HOLDING POLLUTERS ACCOUNTABLE 
(2008); CTR. FOR JUSTICE & DEMOCRACY, PUNITIVE DAMAGES:  RARE, REASONABLE, AND EFFECTIVE (2007). 
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Haslip,8 BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore,9 State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Insurance Co. v. Campbell,10 Philip Morris USA v. Williams,11 to Exxon 
Shipping Co. v. Baker,12 has expressed concern about the magnitude of some 
punitive damage awards, especially the ratio of punitive to compensatory 
damages and their relation to case characteristics.  In BMW, the Court stated 
that “low awards of compensatory damages may properly support a higher ratio 
[of punitive to compensatory damages] if, for example, a particularly egregious 
act has resulted in only a small amount of economic damages.”13  The BMW 
Court outlined a three-factor test for evaluating whether a punitive damage was 
excessive: (1) the reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct; (2) the disparity 
between the compensatory award and the punitive damage award; and (3) the 
existence and amount of any alternative state sanctions for similar 
misconduct.14  In BMW and again in State Farm, the Court further expressed a 
guideline indicating that harms involving financial injury should be seen as less 
deserving of high punitive damages ratios than harms involving personal 
injuries.  In Haslip, the Court found that a punitive to compensatory damage 
ratio of 4:1 was “close to the line” on unconstitutionality.15  In State Farm, the 
Court suggested that ordinarily punitive damages should not exceed 
compensatory damages, and a ratio of single digit (that is, 9:1) is the outer limit 
of punitive to compensatory damages.16  The Court further stated “[o]ur 
jurisprudence and the principles it has now established demonstrate, however, 
that, in practice, few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and 
compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process.”17 
Yet, Michael Rustad, in his review of punitive damages legislation across 
the United States, argued that when state legislatures have decided that punitive 
damages are a problem, they have enacted substantive or procedural reforms 
intended to curb excesses.18  The procedural reforms include restrictions on 
pleading, discovery, evidence, jury instructions, increases in the standard of 
                                                           
 8.  499 U.S. 1 (1991). 
 9.  517 U.S. 559 (1996). 
 10.  538 U.S. 408 (2003). 
 11.  549 U.S. 346 (2007). 
 12.  128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008). 
 13.  See BMW, 517 U.S. at 582.  
 14.  See BMW, 517 U.S. at 574-75.  See generally Virginia Canipe, Note, Crossing the Excessiveness 
Line:  The Implications of BMW v. Gore on Multi-Billion Dollar Tobacco Litigation Punitive Damages, 36 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1157 (2001); Son B. Nguyen, Note, BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore:  Elevating 
Reasonableness in Punitive Damages to a Doctrine of Substantive Due Process, 57 MD. L. REV. 251 (1998). 
 15.  See Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23 (1991); see also BMW of North America, Inc. v. 
Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 581 (1996) (reiterating holding in Haslip). 
 16.  See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003).  
 17.  Id. (citing Haslip and Gore). 
 18.  See Rustad, supra note 5, at 1300-01 (noting various state legislative reforms involving punitive 
damages); see also Sheila B. Scheuerman & Anthony J. Franze, Instructing Juries on Punitive Damages:  Due 
Process Revisited After Philip Morris v. Williams, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. LAW 1147, 1168-91 (2008) (noting 
states’ revisions to punitive damage instructions after Haslip and State Farm). 
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proof for punitive damages, and devices such as bifurcation and restrictions on 
the use of wealth to ensure greater judicial control over punitive awards, while 
substantive reforms include caps on the amount of the punitive damage award.  
Indeed, Rustad argued that the U.S. Supreme Court and state legislatures “have 
constructed a pro-defendant iron cage” around punitive damages.19  The 
circumstances under which punitive damages are allowed and the relationship 
between compensatory and punitive damages vary dramatically from state to 
state.20  As shown in Appendix A, in all but five states that allow punitive 
damages, such awards are substantially limited, either in definition or in 
application.21 
Empirical research on punitive damages generally suggests that punitive 
damages do not endanger the legal system.  Specifically, scholars have found 
that punitive awards have not increased in frequency over time; most awards 
are modest in size and show a reasonable proportionality between harm and 
potential harm of conduct; juries pay particular attention to the reprehensibility 
of conduct; and there is little evidence supporting the claim that juries are 
biased against businesses.22  The most recent U.S. Supreme Court case 
involving punitive damages, Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, concerned maritime 
law but has implied relevance for state tort law.  Therein, the Court agreed with 
the empirical findings, but with a major reservation. 
Justice Souter, writing for the Exxon Shipping majority, reviewed part of the 
body of empirical evidence bearing on punitive damages.23  He concluded that 
empirical research showed that there are “not mass-produced runaway 
awards”24 and that “by most accounts the median ratio of punitive to 
compensatory awards has remained less than 1:1.”25  Justice Souter also 
concluded that the research showed no marked increase in awards over the past 
several decades.  Nevertheless, he asserted, “the real problem, it seems, is the 
stark unpredictability of punitive awards.”26  He went on to refer to an analysis 
of the Civil Justice Survey of State Courts conducted by the Bureau of Justice 
Statistics (BJS), concluding: 
 
A recent comprehensive study of punitive damages awarded by juries in state 
civil trials found a median ratio of punitive to compensatory awards of just 
                                                           
 19.  See Rustad, supra note 5, at 1301 (discussing constraints on punitive damage awards). 
 20.  See Appendix A (surveying legal and monetary limits on punitive damages by state). 
 21.  See id. (indicating punitive damages not allowed in Louisiana, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New 
Hampshire, and Washington). 
 22.  See Brief of Neil Vidmar & Brian Bornstein et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Philip 
Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007) (No. 05-1256) (reciting empirical findings indicating juries 
perform reaonsably). 
 23.  Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2624-27 (2008) (citing punitive damage research) 
 24.  Id. at 2624.  
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Id. at 2625. 
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0.62:1, but a mean ratio of 2.90:1 and a standard deviation of 13.81 . . . .  Even 
to those of us unsophisticated in statistics, the thrust of these figures is clear: 
the spread is great, and the outlier cases subject defendants to punitive damages 
that dwarf the corresponding compensatories . . . .  Other studies of some of the 
same data show that fully 14% of punitive awards in 2001 were greater than 
four times the compensatory damages . . . with 18% of punitives in the 1990s 
more than trebling the compensatory damages . . . .  And a study of “financial 
injury” cases using a different data set found that 34% of the punitive awards 
were greater than three times the corresponding compensatory damages.27 
 
Theodore Eisenberg, Michael Heise, and Martin Wells have replied to 
Justice Souter’s analysis, arguing that Justice Souter missed the fact that 
variability of awards relates to the level of the compensatory awards.28  To 
demonstrate this argument, Eisenberg and his co-authors reexamined the results 
of the study relied upon by the Court in Exxon Shipping.  By comparing the 
levels of compensatory awards with the punitive award, those authors 
concluded that most of the variability in the punitive to compensatory award 
ratios was associated with cases at the low end of compensatory damage 
awards, specifically those involving less than $10,000 in compensatory 
damages.29  In cases involving compensatory awards under $1000, the mean 
ratio was roughly 100:1, and cases involving compensatory awards under 
$10,000 had a ratio of approximately 10:1.30  However, for cases involving 
over $10,000 in compensatory damages, the mean ratios were approximately 
1.5:1 with standard deviations ranging from 1.31 to 3.58.31  In short, a 
substantial amount of the variability in the punitive to compensatory damage 
ratios was associated with cases on the very low end of the monetary scale. 
The research of Eisenberg and his co-authors represents an important 
contribution to understanding the profile of punitive damages, but it is 
incomplete.  Previous research by Rustad, Eisenberg, and Vidmar and Rose has 
drawn attention to the causes of action as factors related to the likelihood and 
magnitude of punitive damages.32  For example, Vidmar and Rose’s research 
                                                           
 27.  Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2625 (2008) (citations omitted); see generally 
Theodore Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges, and Punitive Damages:  Empirical Analyses Using the Civil Justice 
Survey of State Courts 1992, 1996, and 2001 Data, 3 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 263 (2006). 
 28.  See Theodore Eisenberg et al., Variability in Punitive Damages:  An Empirical Assessment of the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s Decision in Exxon Shipping v. Baker (Cornell Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper Series, 
Paper No. 09-011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1392438. 
 29.  See id. at 14 (highlighting punitive-compensatory ratio). 
 30.  See id. at 15, Table 2 (presenting summary statistics of jury cases involving punitive and 
compensatory damages). 
 31.  See id. at 15, Table 2 (analyzing summary statistics). 
 32.  See generally Theodore Eisenberg et al., The Predictability Of Punitive Damages, 26 J. OF LEGAL 
STUD. 623 (1997) (noting strong correlation between punitive and compensatory damages); Michael L. Rustad, 
Unraveling Punitive Damages: Current Data and Further Inquiry, 1998 WISC. L. REV. 15 (1998) (indicating 
no nationwide punitive damage crisis); Michael Rustad, In Defense of Punitive Damages in Product Liability:  
Testing Tort Anecdotes with Empirical Data, 78 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1992) (suggesting punitive damage awards in 
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indicates that, in Florida, while the median ratio of punitive to compensatory 
damages over all cases between 1989 and 1998 was 0.67:1, there was 
substantial variability across case types.33  Cases involving funeral homes’ 
improper treatment of dead persons had a median ratio of 6.3:1, while cases 
involving discrimination or harassment claims had a ratio of 2.3:1.34  Vidmar 
and Rose also documented nuances in juries’ application of punitive damages 
within the subset of products and premises liability cases.35  In one case a jury 
awarded only compensatory damages against a corporate defendant but levied 
punitive damages (in a modest amount) against its drunken employee who was 
driving the delivery truck that injured the plaintiff.36 
It is important to observe that the Supreme Court itself has been inconsistent 
in its application of the proportionality ratio.  Although in State Farm Justice 
Kennedy, writing for the majority, asserted, “in practice, few awards exceeding 
a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a 
significant degree, will satisfy due process,” the Court previously 
acknowledged that there are cases in which the compensable injury will be 
small but the reprehensibility of the conduct is great.37  Thus, in 1993 the Court 
approved an extremely large ratio in a case involving a financial injury.  TXO 
Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.38 involved a business dispute 
over an oil and gas contract.  The Court upheld a jury award of $10,000,000 in 
punitive damages compared to a compensatory damage award of only $19,000 
(a 526:1 ratio), describing the behavior of TXO as “egregiously tortious 
conduct.”39  In March 2009, the Court denied certiorari in a re-appeal of the 
Philip Morris USA v. Williams verdict, thus tacitly allowing a punitive award of 
$79,500,000 against a compensatory award of $502,100, yielding a punitive to 
compensatory ratio of 158:1.40 
In the present research, we focus only on jury verdicts and ignore verdicts 
rendered by judges in bench trials.  We do so on the grounds that most of the 
criticism regarding punitive damages centers on the jury and that cases decided 
in bench trials tend to be different than cases decided by juries, making 
                                                                                                                                       
products liability cases should be studied empirically); Neil Vidmar & M. R. Rose, Punitive Damages by Juries 
in Florida:  In Terrorem and in Reality, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 487 (2001) (studying punitive damage awards 
in Florida).  
 33.  See Vidmar & Rose, supra note 32, at 493-94 (noting variability in median across years explained by 
case type). 
 34.  See id. at 500 (discussing variability of awards by cause of action). 
 35.  See id. at 496-500 (noting punitives awarded in 16 of 20 products liability, 14 of 17 premises liability 
cases). 
 36.  See id. at 500 (reciting facts of premises liability case involving alcohol consumption). 
 37.  538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003). 
 38.  509 U.S. 443 (1993). 
 39.  Id. at 466. 
 40.  See Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Williams, 129 S. Ct. 1436 (2009) (dismissing writ of certiorari as 
improvidently granted). 
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comparisons difficult.41 
We first develop a profile of punitive damages from the 2005 Civil Justice 
Survey of State Courts.42  We supplement these data with a second database 
involving punitive damages claims in Arizona, California, Florida, Illinois, 
Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, and Texas.  Using Westlaw, 
we developed a systematic search method that provided qualitative information 
on the wide variety of cases reported in 2005 by jury verdict reporters.  While 
verdict reporters are selective in reporting cases, they do contain additional 
verdicts outside of the selected counties of the BJS data and, more importantly 
for our present purpose, they often provide rich qualitative details about causes 
of action and procedural processes associated with the case and resulting 
verdict.  These details provide insight bearing on the litigation outcome.43 
II.  METHOD 
The first part of our analysis uses the 2005 Civil Justice Survey of State 
Courts.  Although the 2005 survey added additional counties to its list of 
surveyed courts, the present report is based upon the publicly available data 
archived in the Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research 
(ICPSR) at the University of Michigan.  The data provide information on all 
completed civil jury cases from the forty-six largest county courts in the United 
States.  These data are statistically representative of the seventy-five largest 
county courts in the United States.44  As mentioned above, in contrast to 
previous surveys, the 2005 data include a variable indicating whether, in the 
pleadings, either party requested punitive damages.  These new data on 
requests for punitive damages allow for a more accurate measure of the rate of 
prevailing in cases with claims for punitive damages. 
To complement the BJS data, we constructed a database from verdict 
reporters in Westlaw for all jury trial cases resolved in 2005 where the court 
reporter mentions punitive damages.  Using Westlaw’s jury verdict reporters 
for each state, we searched for “punitive damages,” excluding all cases that did 
not match our criteria.45  The cases are from Arizona (forty-five cases), 
                                                           
 41.  See Theodore Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges, and Punitive Damages:  Empirical Analyses Using the 
Civil Justice Survey of State Courts 1992, 1996, and 2001 Data, 3 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 263, 263-65 
(2006) (distinguishing jury- from court-awarded damages). 
 42.  See generally LYNN LANGTON & THOMAS H. COHEN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL BENCH AND JURY 
TRIALS IN STATE COURTS, 2005 (2008) (providing statistics regarding damage award amounts).  The 2005 
survey added a new variable that was not coded in the 1992, 1996 and 2001 surveys, namely whether punitive 
damages were requested in the pleadings by one of the parties.  This allows us to estimate the success rates 
when plaintiffs seek punitive damages. 
 43.  See Cynthia Lee & Nicole Waters, A Verdict on the Reporters:  The Representativeness of 
Commercially Published Jury Reports, Presentation at the Annual Meeting of the Law and Society Association 
(May 25, 2009) (noting discrepancy between Civil Justice Survey data and jury verdict reports). 
 44.  See http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/23862 (collecting data on general civil and 
non-trial 2005 matters). 
 45.  We coded by:  (1) state; (2) Westlaw number; (3) whether the case was tried by a jury; (4) the date of 
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California (eighty-five cases), Florida (thirty-four cases), Illinois (twenty 
cases), Missouri (forty-seven cases), New York (thirty-three cases), New Jersey 
(fifteen cases), Pennsylvania (thirteen cases), and Texas (110 cases).  Although 
Lee and Waters’ 2009 research indicates that verdict reports are often not 
representative of all the cases appearing in the courts, they often contain 
information bearing on the procedural details after the filing of the claims and 
the substantive content of the claims.  Both of these pieces of information allow 
inferences as to why the jury awarded or did not award punitive damages and 
on the amounts of the awards. 
III.  RESULTS FROM THE BJS DATABASE 
A.  Frequency of Punitive Damage Requests 
We first examine how frequently either party requests punitive damages.  
Typically, the party is the plaintiff; but in some instances, such as business 
disputes, the defendant asks for punitive damages by counterclaim.  The bottom 
row in Table 1 reports that in the forty-six largest counties in the U.S. in 2005, 
there were 6472 cases tried by juries.  Punitive damages were requested in 567 
instances, or approximately 9% of all jury trials. 
Table 1 disaggregates these overall data by the causes of action as 
categorized by the BJS coding system reporting the number of times that at 
least one of the parties requested punitive damages. 
 
TABLE 1:  TOTAL AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES, BY CLAIM TYPE 















Motor Vehicle Tort 2,673 42% 92 3% 
Premises Liability 803 12% 22 3% 
Product Liability (Asbestos) 51 1% 6 12% 
                                                                                                                                       
the verdict; (5) the claim type according to the BJS category,; (6) the type of tort involved, including personal 
injury, dignitary, and financial injury; (7) the number of plaintiffs; (8) the number of defendants; (9) the amount 
sought in damages; (10) whether the plaintiff prevailed on any compensatory negligence defense; (11) the total 
amount of compensatory award; (12) whether the plaintiff prevailed on a punitive negligence claim; (13) the 
total amount of the punitive award, if any; (14) reasons the plaintiff did not prevail on punitive claim, including 
that:  (a) the judge refused to allow before trial; (b) the judge allowed plaintiff to argue claim but refused to 
instruct jury; (c) the jury refused to award punitives; (d) the jury awarded punitives, but the judge rejected the 
award in judgment; (e) the parties settled the punitive damages claim during or before trial; (f) the jury found 
punitive negligence but gave no punitives; (15) the jury awarded punitives but the judge remitted the amount (1 
= yes; 2 = no); (16) a brief synopsis of the case and any unusual characteristics. 
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Product Liability (Other) 118 2% 13 11% 
Intentional Tort 212 3% 49 23% 
Malpractice (Medical) 980 15% 58 6% 
Malpractice (Other) 51 1% 5 10% 
Slander, Libel, Defamation 40 1% 18 45% 
Animal Attack 39 1% 6 15% 
Conversion 29 0% 12 41% 
False Arrest /Imprisonment 22 0% 4 18% 
Other Negligence 170 3% 13 8% 
Fraud 255 4% 71 28% 
Seller Plaintiff (Contract) 166 3% 18 11% 
Buyer Plaintiff (Contract) 315 5% 45 14% 
Mortgage Foreclosure 5 0% 1 20% 
Employment (Discrimination) 117 2% 42 36% 
Employment (Other) 117 2% 34 29% 
Rental/Lease Agreement 51 1% 9 18% 
Intentional/Tortious Interference 51 1% 18 35% 
Partnership Dispute 21 0% 7 33% 
Other/Unknown Commercial 47 1% 11 23% 
Subrogation 6 0% 2 33% 
Eminent Domain/Condemnation 54 1% 0 0% 
Title or Boundary Dispute 26 0% 8 31% 
Other/Unknown Real Property 8 0% 3 38% 
Total/ Average Percent  6,427 99% 567 8.8% 
 
Table 1 demonstrates that plaintiffs’ requests for punitive damages varied 
significantly by cause of action.  Requests for punitive damages were most 
frequently made in suits involving slander or defamation (45%), conversion 
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(41%), real property disputes (38%), employment discrimination (36%), 
tortious interference (35%), partnership disputes (33%) and subrogated claims 
(33%).  Plaintiffs in cases involving motor vehicle claims (3%), premises 
liability claims (3%) and medical malpractice claims (6%) rarely sought 
punitive damages.  In non-asbestos product liability cases, one of the most 
frequently cited topics in the controversy over punitive damages, punitive 
damages were only requested 11% of the time.46 
B.  The Likelihood of Prevailing on General Negligence and Punitive Damages 
Ordinarily, the party requesting punitive damages cannot prevail unless first 
prevailing on the claim of general compensatory negligence.47  There is a 
general presumption that a party making a claim for punitive damages has a 
strong case for compensatory negligence.  The second issue of interest relating 
to claims for punitive damages is the likelihood of the jury awarding punitive 
damages.  Table 2 reports the frequency with which the party requesting 
punitive damages prevailed. 
 
TABLE 2: PLAINTIFF WINS BY PLAINTIFF CLAIM TYPE 














Motor Vehicle Tort 92 59 64% 12 13% 
Premises Liability 22 9 41% 1 5% 
Product Liability (Asbestos) 6 2 33% 1 17% 
Product Liability (Other) 13 1 8% 0 0% 
Intentional Tort 49 33 67% 21 43% 
Malpractice (Medical) 58 16 28% 4 7% 
Malpractice (Other) 5 3 60% 1 20% 
Slander, Libel, Defamation 18 12 67% 9 50% 
                                                           
 46.  Nineteen of the punitive damages cases arising out of product litigation involved prescription drugs 
(such as Phen-fen), while three involved tobacco. 
 47.  See Wells v. Smith, 297 S.E.2d 872, 881 (W. Va. 1982) (affirming jury award of punitive damages 
notwithstanding lack of compensatory damages).  The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held that a 
defendant could be liable for punitive damages even if the jury did not award the plaintiff any compensatory 
damages.  Indeed, in Shulman v. Hunderfund, a New York defamation case discussed later in this paper, the 
jury found the defendant liable and awarded $100,000 in punitives but gave nothing for compensatory 
damages.  See Shulman v. Hunderfund, 852 N.Y.S.2d 178, 180 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) rev’d 905 N.E.2d 1159 
(N.Y. 2009). 
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Animal Attack 6 6 100% 0 0% 
Conversion 12 6 50% 4 33% 
False Arrest /Imprisonment 4 0 0% 0 0% 
Other Negligence 13 7 54% 4 31% 
Fraud 71 54 76% 26 37% 
Seller Plaintiff (Contract) 18 13 72% 3 17% 
Buyer Plaintiff (Contract) 45 31 69% 12 27% 
Mortgage Foreclosure 1 1 100% 0 0% 
Employment 
(Discrimination) 
42 25 60% 5 12% 
Employment (Other) 34 19 56% 11 32% 
Rental/Lease Agreement 9 6 67% 2 22% 
Intentional /Tortious 
Interference 
18 11 61% 5 28% 
Partnership Dispute 7 6 86% 3 43% 
Other/Unknown Contract 
11 8 73% 4 36% 
Subrogation 2 2 100% 1 50% 
Eminent 
Domain/Condemnation 
0 0 -- -- -- 
Title or Boundary Dispute 8 0 -- 2 25% 
Other/Unknown Real 
Property 
3 0 -- -- 0% 
TOTAL /MEAN 
PERCENTAGE 
567 330 58% 131 23% 
 
As Table 2 shows, a party’s request for punitive damages is generally 
associated with prevailing on liability for compensatory negligence, but is not a 
guarantee of winning.  Columns three and four of Table 2 present, by cause of 
action, the frequency with which cases involving punitive damages claims 
resulted in a party prevailing on liability for general compensatory negligence.  
The only category in which claims for punitive damages always resulted in a 
compensatory win for the plaintiff were cases involving animal attacks and 
mortgage foreclosures.  The number of such cases was very small, however, 
(six and one, respectively) and none of the cases involving animal attacks or 
mortgage foreclosures resulted in large punitive damage awards.  Overall, the 
chance of prevailing on a compensatory negligence claim if punitive damages 
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were requested was 58%, but, again, the outcome varied by cause of action.  In 
short, requesting punitive damages in pleadings was no guarantee that a party 
would prevail even on the general compensatory negligence claim. 
The last two columns in Table 2 report the number of instances in which the 
plaintiff prevailed on the punitive damages claim after prevailing on 
compensatory liability.  The last row in Table 2 shows that, of the 567 instances 
in which a party requested punitive damages, such damages were awarded 131 
times, or in 23% of trials.  However, if we examine the rate of success in 
punitive damages awards by the type of claim, we again find considerable 
variability.  In particular, despite assertions about the dangers posed by product 
liability cases mentioned in the introduction to this article, there was only one 
instance of a punitive damage award in product liability cases in the 2005 
survey and that involved an asbestos claim.  There were no punitive damages 
awarded in non-asbestos product liability cases.  There was only one punitive 
damage award among the premises liability cases.  In contrast, parties 
requesting punitive damages in slander and defamation cases—some of which, 
as we will see, appear to arise out of business disputes—prevailed half of the 
time.  In intentional torts and partnership dispute cases where the plaintiff or 
defendant requested punitive damages, the jury awarded those damages 43% of 
the time.  In short, these data contradict the images fostered by tort reform 
groups that juries side with individuals suing businesses and provide large 
punitive damage awards.  Rather, the beneficiaries of punitive damages are 
often business plaintiffs suing business defendants.48 
C.  Variables Associated with Failure to Obtain Punitive Damages 
The BJS data show only whether the pleadings indicated that punitive 
damages were requested.  The data, however, do not give further information 
bearing on what occurred after the parties requested punitive damages.  Yet, as 
Table 2 indicates, asking for punitive damages by no means guarantees that a 
jury will award compensatory or punitive damages.  Indeed, the success rates 
were quite low for most causes of action.  One explanation for these low 
success rates, as indicated in Table 2, was that the party did not succeed on the 
claim of compensatory damages.49 
While we will discuss the Westlaw jury report data in detail in the next 
section, it is worthwhile digressing to those data here because they provide 
additional insights about Table 2, specifically, the procedural processes bearing 
on the failure of plaintiffs to recover punitive damages.50  Many states have 
                                                           
 48.  See VALERIE P. HANS, BUSINESS ON TRIAL:  THE CIVIL JURY AND CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY 
(2000) (discussing jury attitudes toward business defendants). 
 49.  Looking at the rates of prevailing on liability, plaintiffs are as likely to prevail on liability whether 
they ask for punitive damages or not. 
 50.  We caution, again, that the Westlaw data are neither comprehensive nor a random sample of cases.  
Furthermore, the record of procedural details is often incomplete and thus cannot provide reliable estimates of 
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engaged in limiting punitive damages awards by either requiring “clear and 
convincing evidence” or by limiting the pleading of punitive damages to a 
separate stage only after a plaintiff succeeds in winning compensatory 
damages.  Rustad’s Iron Cage outlines, in detail, the procedural limitations on 
punitive damages in each state.51  We focus on the six primary paths that result 
in the non-award of a plaintiff’s punitive damages claim during the trial. 
1.  The trial judge refused the plaintiff the opportunity to plead punitive 
damages before the trial began. 
In Pena v. Ford Motor Co.,52 a product liability case, the defendants 
received partial summary judgment on the punitive damages claim before the 
trial started.  A Missouri case, Locke v. Suntrup Hyundai Inc.53 involved a sales 
tax dispute over the purchase of an automobile; the judge denied a claim for 
punitive damages.  In Nolan v. Myerly,54 an animal attack case, the defendant 
was granted summary judgment before the trial began.  We suspect, but cannot 
prove from the present data, that this is the most frequent cause of failure to 
win on an initial punitive damages claim.  In most jurisdictions, the plaintiff 
must demonstrate willful, wanton, or malicious behavior, and judges appear to 
be exercising their statutory or common law discretion in pre-trial 
proceedings.55 
2.  The plaintiff decided, for whatever reason, not to plead for punitive 
damages at the start or end of the trial. 
In Tual v. Blake,56 the plaintiff initially asked for but then did not press for 
punitive damages in an intentional tort case. 
3.  The plaintiff did not prevail on compensatory liability. 
As already noted, Table 2 indicates that failure to prevail on compensatory 
damages accounted for a substantial number of cases in which punitive 
damages were sought.  Table 2 also shows that the success rates in obtaining 
punitive damages varied substantially by case type.  Generally, regardless of 
the type of case, asking for punitive damages is not a good predictor of success 
in obtaining compensatory damages. 
                                                                                                                                       
the actual frequencies of the various procedural events.  However, despite these shortcomings, the data yield 
important information bearing on why litigants who request punitive damages in the pleadings often fail to 
receive them. 
 51.  See generally Rustad, supra note 5, at 1299 (noting “far-reaching procedural safeguards” 
constraining punitive damages).  Rustad surveys the standards and limits on punitive damages in all 51 United 
States jurisdictions in his article.  See Rustad, supra note 5, at 1370-1417 (surveying all states and D.C.)  
 52.  No. CV2002-022937, 2005 WL 3288763 (Ariz. Super. Ct. Aug. 26, 2005) (verdict summary) 
(assessing costs for defendant automobile maker). 
 53.  No. 04CC-003604, 2005 WL 4858939 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Oct. 12, 2005) (verdict summary) (awarding 
$936 to plaintiff for amount sales tax on claim of misrepresentation of contract). 
 54.  No. RIC359499, 2005 WL 4880604 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 17, 2005) (verdict summary) (awarding 
$207,600 for plaintiff). 
 55.  See Rustad, supra note 5, at 1327 (describing different jurisdictions’ approaches to punitive 
damages). 
 56.  No. EC034380, 2005 WL 3677180 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 18, 2005) (verdict summary) (awarding 
$30,000,000 in damages).  
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4.  The judge deferred the decision on punitive damages until the end of the 
trial, but then ruled against instructing the jury that they could consider 
punitive damages or, alternatively, allowed the pleading but subsequently 
remitted the award. 
Leon v. Billings57 involved a medical malpractice claim accompanied by a 
claim of battery.  The judge allowed the plea and argument of punitive damages 
but then entered a directed verdict against punitive damages at the close of the 
plaintiff’s case.58  In Tummillo v. Gallagher,59 plaintiff condominium buyers 
sued the sellers for fraud, alleging that the sellers failed to disclose the full 
extent of water damage to the condo.  The jury awarded $5000 in punitive 
damages, but nothing for compensatory damages and the trial judge then 
remitted the entire punitive award. 
5.  The jury awarded compensatory damages but refused to award punitive 
damages. 
In Ameri v. Bouzari,60 a business dispute involving charges of fraud, the jury 
found punitive negligence on the part of both the plaintiff and defendant and 
consequently awarded no punitive damages to either party.  Cappa v. CrossTest 
Inc.61 involved an employment claim in which there was a nonsuit on the 
plaintiff’s claim; the jury found for the cross-complainant on a counterclaim, 
including a finding of malice, but awarded no punitive damages.  Hall-Edwards 
v. Ford Motor Co.62 involved a product liability claim.  The jury found that 
Ford placed a vehicle on the market with a defect relating to its stability and 
handling, which was a legal cause of the accident, but no punitive damages 
were awarded.63 
6.  The opposing parties reached a private settlement on punitive damages 
before or during the trial, thus preempting the jury from hearing the punitive 
damages claim. 
In Witherow v. Omm, Inc.,64 a negligence claim involving a construction 
death, the parties privately settled the claim for punitive damages, but the 
negligence claim went to the jury and resulted in nearly $7,000,000 in 
                                                           
 57.  No. CI002-2769 Div. 33, 2005 WL 3626816 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug. 18, 2005) (verdict summary) 
(awarding $1,250,000 in damages). 
 58.  See id. (reciting facts). 
 59.  No. 02 L 844, 2005 WL 3941260 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Sept. 29, 2005) (verdict summary) (noting verdict of 
$5000 reduced to $0 by judge order). 
 60.  No. CV2004-006498, 2005 WL 3728776 (Ariz. Super. Ct. Oct. 19, 2005) (verdict summary) (noting 
mixed verdict, no damages on any count). 
 61.  No. CIV 440552, 2005 WL 4708227 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 19, 2005) (verdict summary) (indicating 
jury elected not to award punitive damages despite finding of malice). 
 62.  No. 99-9450CA 22, 2005 WL 3999843 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 15, 2005) (verdict summary) (noting jury 
awarded plaintiff $61,200,000). 
 63.  See id. 
 64.  No. 02-09668 Div. E, 2005 WL 3030126 (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 23, 2005) (verdict summary) (noting 
award of $6,887,000 on negligence claim). 
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compensatory damages.  In Meuser v. Weaver,65 a motor vehicle lawsuit, the 
parties stipulated to $100,000 in punitive damages in a pre-trial agreement.  In 
Williams v. Renaissance at Hillside Inc.,66 an Illinois case involving claims that 
nursing home negligence led to bedsores and required a ventilator for the 
patient over a period of two years, the defendant settled for $2,800,000 shortly 
after the trial judge ruled that the jury could hear any claims relating to punitive 
damages. 
Finally, attention should be given to the fact that, as already mentioned 
above, in some cases (especially involving financial disputes), the punitive 
damages claims were made in counterclaims by defendants.  This significantly 
clouds the picture of who receives punitive damages.  In a few instances, the 
plaintiff asked for punitive damages and the defendant, in a countersuit, asked 
for punitive damages.  In other cases, while the plaintiff did not request 
punitive damages, the defendant pled for punitive damages. 
D.  Size and Ratios of Punitive Damages to Compensatory Damages by Type of 
Case 
We turn now to the central concerns of the Supreme Court about the overall 
size of awards, the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages, and the 
relationship of case characteristics to the ratio of punitive to compensatory 
damages.  We examine this problem from several directions.  First, we consider 
the Supreme Court’s assertion in BMW and later in State Farm that harms 
involving financial injury are usually less deserving of high punitive to 
compensatory damage ratios than harms involving personal injuries.  In theory, 
it would be important to examine each of the individual BJS categories set out 
in Tables 1 and 2, but doing so would not allow meaningful comparisons 
because of the small number of cases in most of the categories.  However, the 
BJS database combines the individual categories into four general categories of 
claims: personal injury torts, financial injury torts, employment related claims 
and claims related to property.  We utilize this same categorization system as 
the first part of our exploration of the relationship of punitive to compensatory 
awards.  Table 3 reports the punitive to compensatory relationships on a 






                                                           
 65.  No. CIV223098, 2005 WL 5266836 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 2, 2005) (verdict summary) (indicating 
stipulated punitive award of $100,000). 
 66.  No. 02-1-002286, 2005 WL 3054475 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Oct. 19, 2005) (verdict summary) (summarizing 
$2,800,000 award). 
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Number Asking for Punitive Damages 281 152 76 58 
Percent Asking for Punitive Damages 6% 16% 32% 22% 
Number Winning Punitive Damages 53 45 16 17 
Percent Winning Punitive Damages 19% 30% 21% 29% 
Mean Compensatory Damages When Punitive 
Damages Were Awarded 
$2,250,987 $2,882,828 $4,425,398 $2,381,849 
Model Compensatory Damages if Punitive 
Damages Were Awarded 
$118,000 $125,000 $305,954 $185,105 
Mean Punitive Damages if Punitive Damages 
Were Awarded 
$2,175,978 $2,196,750 $8,327,674 $4,156,070 
Model Punitive Damages if Punitive Damages 
Were Awarded  
$100,000 $150,000 $345,000 $800,000 
Mean Punitive:  Compensatory Ratio 5:2 3:1 11:6 19:4 
Median Punitive:  Compensatory Ratio                              1:1 1:1 1:1 4:3 
 
We first look at the percent of cases where punitive damages were requested, 
and the rates at which they were awarded.  As Table 3 shows, personal injury 
torts had the fewest requests for punitive damages (6%) and the lowest success 
rate (19%).  Litigants in financial injury cases requested punitive damages 16% 
of the time and prevailed on the request 30% of the time.  Employment-related 
claims requested punitive damages about one-third of the time (32% of cases), 
but the requesting litigant prevailed in only about one case of five (21%).  
Litigants in property cases requested punitive damages in 22% of cases and 
prevailed 29% of the time. 
Table 3 also shows that the mean compensatory award in all four types of 
cases exceeded $2,000,000, but claims involving employment were nearly 
twice as large as the other three categories.  This possibly reflects the fact that 
many employment-related claims involved multiple plaintiffs, including class 
actions.  However, the modal compensatory awards were in the lower hundreds 
of thousands for all four case types.  In short, the differences between mean and 
modal awards suggest substantial variation in the underlying compensatory 
negligence claims.  Looking at the average and modal punitive awards, Table 3 
shows that employment cases had the highest mean and modal punitive awards 
among the four case types.  Examining the ratio between compensatory and 
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punitive damages, we see that the mean ratio varied across case types.  
However, the last row of Table 2 shows that the median ratio for three of the 
case types was 1:1, with the median for property cases slightly above, at 4:3. 
There are alternative ways to look at the data that may be more illuminating.  
For instance, Table 4 presents data regarding the number of cases resulting in 
punitive to compensatory ratios exceeding a single digit (10:1 or higher).67 
 
TABLE 4:  THE RATIO OF COMPENSATORY AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
COMPENSATORY AWARD  NUMBER OF CASES MEAN PUNITIVE TO 
COMPENSATORY RATIO 
NUMBER OF CASES WITH 
RATIOS > 9:1 
$0-999 6 Undefined 4 
$1k-9,999 16 5.3:1 5 
$10k-99,999 33 4.2:1 4 
$100k-999,999 42 1.8:1 0 
$1M-9,999,999 26 2.4:1 1 
$10M or Greater 8 1.0:1 0 
TOTAL 131  14 
 
Table 4 shows that only 14 of the 131 cases resulting in a punitive damages 
award had ratios exceeding a single digit.  These figures, however, need further 
clarification.68 
E.  Punitive Damages Ratios in Cases with Small Compensatory Damages 
The data in Tables 3 and 4 provide enough information to compile a basic 
profile of punitive to compensatory damage ratios.  However, as Table 3 
shows, dramatically different conclusions can be drawn from the data, 
depending on whether the summary statistic is the mean or the median award.  
At some level summary statistics cannot fully address concerns expressed in 
the various Supreme Court decisions about the uncertainty of punitive damages 
or the appropriateness of the ratios between punitive and compensatory 
damages.  As we reviewed in the introduction to this article, the Supreme Court 
has recognized that there are classes of awards where compensable injury will 
                                                           
 67.  See generally Eisenberg, supra note 28 (stratifying cases by the amount of money awarded in 
compensatory damages).  Eisenberg found that in the BJS 1992, 1996 and 2000 samples the highest punitive to 
compensatory ratios involved cases in which compensatory awards were under $10,000.  Id. at 15-16. 
 68.  The low number of cases with a ratio exceeding the Supreme Court’s specification of single digits 
can also be weighted even lower; all of the cases with a punitive damage award and a compensatory award of 
less than $1000 (the first row of Table 4) have no compensatory damage award, meaning that the ratio between 
punitive and compensatory damages is incalculable.  
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be modest (or nil) but the behavior is judged to be highly reprehensible.  
Shulman v. Hunderfund,69 was a defamation case in which the jury awarded 
punitive damages for $100,000, but gave no award for compensatory damages.  
The BJS database limits our insights about punitive damages cases decided by 
juries because it lacks substantive details about the cases.  Therefore, we now 
turn to our database constructed from Westlaw, emphasizing both qualitative 
and quantitative data.70 
IV.  PUNITIVE DAMAGES: A QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS BY 
SELECTED STATES 
As we just discussed, some cases (such as Shulman v. Hunderfund) appear to 
demonstrate exceptions to the single-digit standard.  Thus, while the BJS 
quantitative information provides us with representative general patterns, we 
argue that a qualitative analysis will help to place the jury verdicts in factual 
context.71  In the discussion that follows, we focus on punitive to compensatory 
ratios that exceed the single-digit standard, but in a few instances also draw 
attention to some very large punitive awards even when the punitive to 
compensatory ratios were nevertheless below a single digit. 
A.  Arizona 
A search of Arizona’s jury verdict reports revealed forty-five cases in which 
a party requested punitive damages.  However, only three cases resulted in 
punitive damages, one of which exceeded the single-digit ratio.  Appendix A 
shows that Arizona’s standard for punitive damages requires that the defendant 
engage in behavior that involves a substantial risk of harm, for both general and 
specific deterrence, or behavior that constitutes “outrageous conduct.”72  
Burden v. May73 involved an intentional tort claim by an off-duty police officer, 
still in uniform, who alleged that he had been assaulted in a bar by a hockey 
player.  The jury awarded the plaintiff $1570 in compensatory damages and 
$25,000 in punitive damages, yielding a punitive to compensatory ratio of 
16:1.74  While this case exceeds the Supreme Court’s suggested ratio of 9:1, the 
actual size of the awards ($1570 and $25,000) are far lower than the “runaway” 
punitive damage awards that legislators and lobbyists point out when 
                                                           
 69.  905 N.E.2d 1159 (N.Y. 2009). 
 70.  The complete data from the Westlaw research is available upon request from the authors.  
 71.  Keep in mind that, unlike the BJS data, the cases are not a random sample and are almost certainly 
weighted toward plaintiffs emerging as winners, often with large awards. 
 72.  See Hawkins v. Allstate Ins. Co., 733 P.2d 1073, 1080 (Ariz. 1987) (noting punitive damages 
available when plaintiff proves defendant acted with “evil mind”); Smith v. Chapman, 564 P.2d 900, 903 (Ariz. 
1977) (indicating punitive damages available in Arizona for outrageous conduct or reckless indifference).  See 
generally RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 908, cmt. b (1939). 
 73.  No. 1 CA-CV 06-0486, 2007 WL 5447050 (Ariz. Ct. App. Dec. 4, 2007) 
 74.  See id. at 1-2 (reciting facts). 
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advocating for changes to the tort system.75 
B.  California 
The Westlaw search of verdict reports yielded eighty-six trials in which one 
of the litigating parties requested punitive damages in the pleadings, but only 
forty-one of the cases involved punitive damages claims at trial.76  Some of 
these trials overlapped with the BJS cases.  Fourteen of the cases involved 
punitive ratios of 1:1 or less; eleven had ratios of 2:1 or less; five had ratios of 
4:1 or less; six had ratios of less than 10:1; and five cases exceeded the 
Supreme Court’s single-digit guideline. 
The largest punitive to compensatory ratio was in iTech Group Inc. v. 
National Semiconductor.77  The case involved a commercial dispute in which 
the economic loss was $234,358 and the punitive award was over $15,000,000, 
resulting in a ratio of 64:1.  iTech was a start-up company that alleged breach 
of contract by National Semiconductor under the parties’ software licensing 
agreement and fraud for misstatements National made relative to its stated 
intent to provide source code software to iTech.78  In certain ways, iTech is 
similar to TXO, in which the Supreme Court allowed an extremely large 
punitive to compensatory ratio in a business dispute.  Both iTech and TXO 
illustrate again that many of the large punitive damage awards are in cases that 
involve a business-to-business dispute; these cases are often ignored by those 
seeking to reform or limit punitive damages by focusing on consumers suing 
businesses. 
A second case demonstrates the use of punitive damages as a method of 
punishing behavior that society views as reprehensible.  In Goddard v. Holy 
Cross Catholic Cemetery,79 a cemetery lost cremated remains (called cremains) 
and conspired not to report the loss to the deceased’s family while still selling 
the plaintiffs a headstone for the grave.  The jury awarded $12,113 in actual 
damages and $400,000 in punitives, yielding a ratio of 33:1.80  Goddard is a 
case where the ability of the jury to award a large punitive damage was limited 
by the cost of the product, in this case $12,113, which is a small amount.  To 
express the reprehensibility of the action, the jury rendered a large punitive 
                                                           
 75.  See Engle Verdict Defies Common Sense, Florida Law; PhilipMorris Says Court Created Runaway 
Jury, BUSINESS WIRE, July 14, 2000 available at http://www.allbusiness.com/legal/trial-procedure-jury-
trial/6470981-1html (discussing $145 billion jury verdict). 
 76.  See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294(a) (2010).  Compared to Arizona’s standard, California’s standard for 
punitive damages is more liberal, allowing for punitive damages when the defendant engages in oppression, 
fraud, or malice.  Id.  
 77.  No. 1-02-CV-810872, 2005 WL 3974505 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 27, 2005) (verdict summary) 
(awarding $15,234,358 in punitive damages). 
 78.  See id. (reciting facts). 
 79.  No. GIC833693, 2005 WL 2297579 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 1, 2005) (verdict summary) (noting verdict 
award of $412,113). 
 80.  See id. 
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award.  Goddard is a single example of a wide set of cases in California (and a 
long history of tort cases) involving issues of desecrating dead bodies.81 
In Radosevich v. Amco Insurance Co.,82 a homeowner sued Amco for bad 
faith denial of coverage after an Amco adjustor asserted that a water leak in her 
home was a pre-existing long term leak; the plaintiff produced counter-
evidence.83  The jury awarded $88,830 in compensatory damages and 
$1,500,000 in punitive damages, resulting in a ratio of 17:1.84  Griffin 
Dewatering Corp. v. Northern Insurance Co. of New York85 involved another 
insurance claim.  The plaintiff alleged the insurer failed to defend the 
policyholder against a claim.86  The jury awarded $1,061,188 in compensatory 
damages and $10,000,000 in punitive damages for a ratio of approximately 
10:1.87 
Morris v. Western Convalescent88 was a lawsuit following allegations of 
abuse and neglect of a patient in a nursing facility who underwent a leg 
amputation.  The jury awarded $830,108 in compensatory damages and 
$12,000,000 in punitive damages for a ratio approaching 15:1.89 
Other cases that yielded large ratios just short of the single-digit guideline 
apparently took damage to reputation into account.  For example, in O’Lee v. 
Compuware Corp.,90 a wrongful termination and defamation suit, Compuware 
fired several employees for running a side business with a contractor and 
falsifying invoices for personal gain, among other reasons, and the employees 
filed a wrongful termination and defamation suit.91  The jury found that 
Compuware falsified evidence relating to the firings and awarded the plaintiffs 
$1,150,000 in compensatory damages and $10,000,000 in punitive damages, 
yielding a ratio just short of 9:1.92  O’Lee is consistent with claims that juries 
(and judges) often examine whether a defendant engaged in a cover-up of a 
                                                           
 81.  See Christensen v. Superior Court, 820 P.2d 181, 193, 202 (Cal. 1991) (ruling family members can 
sue cemeteries and crematories for negligent mishandling of decedent’s remains).  The court held, however, 
that family members must witness the conduct in question to establish intentional infliction of emotional 
distress.  See id.  See generally Alex W. Craigie, Burial of a Tort:  The California Supreme Court’s Treatment 
of Tortious Mishandling of Remains in Christensen v. Superior Court, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 909 (1992-1993) 
(exploring background of tortious liability for mishandling human remains and examining Christiansen 
decision). 
 82.  No. 2002076548, 2005 WL 4126683 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 25, 2005) (verdict summary). 
 83.  See id. (reciting facts). 
 84.  See id. (indicating amount of award). 
 85.  No. BC310030, 2005 WL 2297571 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 30, 2005) (verdict summary). 
 86.  See id. (reciting facts). 
 87.  See id. (noting value of damage award). 
 88.  No. BC310030, 2005 WL 2297571 (Cal Super. Ct. June 30, 2005) (verdict summary). 
 89.  See id. (indicating amount of award). 
 90.  No. 406409, 2005 WL 2428694 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 7, 2005) (verdict summary). 
 91.  See id. (reciting facts).  Compuware alleged that the employees were running a side business with a 
contractor and without Compuware’s knowledge; that they had falsified invoices for personal gain and 
conspired with a contractor, and had an illicit and undisclosed relationship.  See id. 
 92.  See id. (noting damage award). 
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problem and whether the plaintiff can provide a “smoking gun,” or other 
explicit evidence of the cover-up.  For example, in Mathias v. Accor Economy 
Lodging,93 Judge Posner upheld a ratio of punitive to compensatory damages of 
37.2:1.94  In doing so, Judge Posner argued evidence that the defendant 
repeatedly engaged in the behavior—and attempted to cover up the behavior 
when confronted—provided the court with the ability to hand out a large 
punitive damage award.95 
In Hettick v. FedEx Corp.,96 a sexual harassment case, two plaintiffs were 
awarded $328,000 in compensatory damages and $2,000,000 in punitive 
damages, resulting in a 6:1 ratio.  The female plaintiff alleged that her FedEx 
coworker developed an obsessive crush on her, alleging that his behavior had 
become so stalker-like over a three-year period that she hid from him at work.97  
According to her testimony, she made many verbal and written complaints to 
managers, but management never took corrective action.  Another plaintiff in 
Hettick alleged that the same coworker had also sexually harassed her with 
comments and intimidating behavior.98  Both plaintiffs alleged that FedEx 
management failed to take sufficient steps to prevent the harassment and that a 
manager ratified the oppressive and malicious behavior of the perpetrator, thus 
entitling them to punitive damages.  In defense, FedEx contended that plaintiffs 
and the alleged perpetrator were friends; that the conduct of the coworker was 
not pervasive, oppressive, or malicious; and that it did not view the contact 
between them as sexual harassment, or at least it did not have knowledge of 
conduct that amounted to sexual harassment.  Additionally, FedEx contended 
that sufficient corrective action had been taken.  FedEx also contended that its 
managing director was not a “managing agent” for purposes of punitive 
damages.99  The jury, siding with the plaintiffs, found sufficient evidence of 
behavior that fit California’s requirements for punitive damages (pervasive, 
oppressive, and malicious behavior), and awarded punitive damages. 
Several other California cases merit description because of the magnitude of 
the punitive damages award even though the punitive to compensatory ratios 
were modest in size.  Savaglio v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc.100 was a class action suit 
involving 115,919 California hourly workers in Wal-Mart and Sam’s Clubs.  
The workers alleged that Wal-Mart systematically refused to give them meal 
breaks as required by California law.  Evidence from time cards revealed 
                                                           
 93.  347 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 94.  Id. at 674, 678. 
 95.  Posner also argues that a case where a large compensatory award is impossible may result in a large 
ratio, as well as behavior that cannot be addressed by criminal torts.  
 96.  No. 103CV010014, 2005 WL 491167 (Cal Super. Ct. Feb. 1, 2005) (verdict summary). 
 97.  See id. (reciting facts). 
 98.  See id. 
 99.  See id. (indicating FedEx defense). 
 100.  No. C8356877, 2005 WL 3804468 (Cal. Super Ct. Dec. 22, 2005) (verdict summary).  Savaglio is 
also in the BJS database. 
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8,100,000 violations between January 2001 and May 2006.101  The plaintiffs 
contended that Wal-Mart knew of these violations but took steps to conceal 
them.102  The jury awarded compensatory damages of $66,131,858 and punitive 
damages of $115,000,000, resulting in a punitive to compensatory ratio of 
1.7:1.103 
Lexar Media v. Toshiba Corp.104 was a business dispute involving claims of 
unfair competition, trade secrets, and breach of fiduciary duty.  The jury 
awarded $284,450,000 in compensatory damages and $84,000,000 in punitive 
damages, yielding a ratio of .3:1. 
Baker v. PrivatAir Inc.105 involved a compensatory award of $51,368,000 
and a punitive award of $10,000,000, yielding a ratio of 0.2:1.  Baker involved 
an age discrimination claim against PrivatAir and a number of persons 
associated with the company.  Baker, a sixty-three-year-old decorated pilot, 
was employed by PrivatAir for many years, and, after being accused of safety 
violations, was replaced with a younger pilot.106  The jury found that the safety 
violations were false and that the younger pilot who replaced Baker was a 
friend of one of the persons involved in the his dismissal.107 
C.  Florida108 
Turning to Florida, thirty-two cases with requests for punitive damages 
appeared in our Westlaw database and thirteen resulted in punitive awards.  
Only one case exceeded the single digit ratio.  In Cabrera v. Eller Media 
Co.,109 a boy died from electrocution while taking cover in a Miami bus shelter.  
The victim’s father alleged that the bus shelter owned by the defendant had 
faulty wiring because it was improperly installed, lacked fusing bonding, and 
had an incorrect transformer.  Eller argued that lightning caused the boy’s 
death, but at trial evidence was introduced that there was less than a 1% chance 
that lightning was the cause of the death.110  The jury awarded $4,100,000 in 
compensatory damages and $61,000,000 in punitive damages, producing a ratio 
of 15:1.  This case is particularly interesting because the jury learned that Eller 
was worth $458,000,000, and it is possible that the jury considered the 
defendant’s financial worth when deciding punitive damages. Under Florida 
law the jury may consider the net worth of a defendant in determining the 
                                                           
 101.  See id. (reciting facts). 
 102.  See id. 
 103.  See id. (indicating damage award). 
 104.  No. CV812458, 2005 WL 3729077 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 23, 2005) (verdict summary). 
 105.  No. BC322198, 2005 WL 3729059 (Cal Super. Ct. Dec. 13, 2005) (verdict summary). 
 106.  See id. (reciting facts). 
 107.  See id. 
 108.  The American Tort Reform Association has routinely referred to Florida as a “judicial hell-hole.”  
AMERICAN TORT REFORM FOUNDATION, JUDICIAL HELLHOLES (2009). 
 109.  No. 98-23808 CA 05, 2005 WL 3030137 (Fla. Cir. Ct. June 24, 2005) (verdict summary).  
 110.  See id. (reciting facts). 
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amount of punitive damages.111  Many states, in contrast, forbid the use of 
wealth in assessing punitive damages. 
D.  Illinois 
Illinois had only seven cases in Westlaw in 2005 that resulted in punitive 
awards, one of which, Blount v. Stroud,112  produced a double-digit ratio.  
Defendant Stroud owned and served as general manager of Jovon Broadcasting 
Corp.  Plaintiff Blount was an employee who had been promoted to local sales 
manager, which entailed supervising four account executives.  She alleged that 
Stroud and Jovon contracted to pay her a 2.5% commission on all new business 
generated by her account executives, but she claimed she never received the 
commission.113  She sued, alleging failure to pay commissions, in violation of 
her contract.  Additionally, she claimed retaliatory termination on the grounds 
that she had refused to agree to commit perjury in connection with a 
coworker’s discrimination lawsuit, seeking punitive damages in connection 
therewith as well as on the grounds that Stroud made several defamatory 
statements about her to third parties during her employment and after she was 
terminated.114  Stroud and Jovon denied contracting to pay the plaintiff’s 
commissions, attempting to coerce her to commit perjury, or making 
defamatory comments.  The defense also filed two counterclaims alleging 
breach of duty and unjust enrichment for accepting a consulting fee for services 
that were never performed.  The jury awarded the plaintiff back pay for the 
employment termination and damages for physical and emotional suffering 
amounting to $282,350 in compensatory damages, and rendered the $2,800,000 
punitive award in relation to the retaliation claim, a ratio of 10:1.  However, the 
jury did not find for the plaintiff on the claims of defamation or intentional 
infliction of emotional distress.115 
E.  Missouri 
Missouri had twelve punitive damages awards reported in 2005 but only two 
exceeded the single-digit ratio.  In Hampton v. State Farm Mutual Automobile 
                                                           
 111.  See Bankers Multiple Line Ins. Co. v. Farish, 464 So.2d 530, 533 (Fla. 1985) (emphasizing 
defendant’s net worth one factor to consider when determining punitive damages). 
 112.  No. 01 L 2330, 2005 WL 4001082 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Nov. 21, 2005) (verdict summary). 
 113.  See id. (reciting facts). 
 114.  See id.  Other claims included wrongful termination in violation of Illinois public policy, intentional 
interference with business expectancy with a prospective business partner and Blount’s subsequent employer, 
as well as conduct involving intention of inflicting emotional distress.  Id. 
 115.  Compare Jablonski v. Ford Motor Co., No. 5-05-0723, 2010 WL 378525 (Ill. App. Ct. Feb. 1, 2010) 
(verdict summary).  After another motorist rear ended Dora Jablonski’s Lincoln Town Car and caused the gas 
tank to explode, she suffered burns to her head, face, ears, nose, shoulders, chest, arms, hands, legs, ankles and 
feet.  Her husband died of thermal burns and inhalation injury. The jury awarded $28,167,715 in compensatory 
damages and $15,000,000 in punitive damages, yielding a punitive to compensatory ratio of 0.5:1.  See id. 
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Insurance Co.,116 the plaintiff purchased a vehicle that was later stolen and 
found burned.  Hampton filed a claim for replacement but State Farm, alleging 
fraud, denied the claim and forced criminal charges against Hampton and a 
codefendant.  After acquittal, the defendants filed suit against State Farm 
alleging malicious prosecution, the tort of outrage, abuse of process, and 
contract fraud.  The case resulted in a compensatory award of $10,300 and a 
punitive award of $800,000, yielding a ratio of 78:1.117 
Smith v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.118 resulted in a compensatory 
award of $2,000,000 and a punitive award of $20,000,000, a ratio of 10:1 in 
favor of a smoker of Kool cigarettes who died of cancer.  The jury found that 
the defendant was only 25% liable, which reduced the compensatory award to 
$500,000, but the punitive award stood.119 
F.  New Jersey 
New Jersey had only three reported punitive damages awards, one of which 
reached a ratio of 1.2:1.  In Verni v. Lanzaro,120 the plaintiff sued both the 
driver of a vehicle and the concession provider at a major sporting arena in 
connection with a drunk-driving collision that resulted in the death of another 
person and a severe disability for plaintiff Verni.  Verni alleged that the driver, 
while spending the afternoon at a professional football game, drank alcohol at a 
concession stand operated by Aramark and was permitted to drive away from 
the stadium despite his obvious intoxication.121  The jury awarded $60,450,000 
in compensatory damages and $75,000,000 in punitive damages.122  Verni is an 
example of one of the few exceptions to the cap on punitive damages—in this 
case, drunk driving—that is part of the New Jersey punitive damages statute. 
G.  New York 
New York only had five punitive damages awards reported in the Westlaw 
database, none of which exceeded the single-digit ratio.  The largest ratio was 
Rose v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,123 involving a $3,420,000 
compensatory award and a $17,100,000 punitive award, a ratio of 5:1.  The 
punitive award was leveled at Brown & Williamson as successor-in-interest to 
Philip Morris on the finding that it disregarded technology that would have 
allowed production of safer cigarettes, and intentionally marketed addictive 
                                                           
 116.  No. 02-CV-211426, 2005 WL 3636236 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Sept. 26, 2005) (verdict summary). 
 117.  See id. (noting amount of damage award). 
 118.  No. 03CV212922, 2005 WL 3505692 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Feb. 3, 2005) (verdict summary). 
 119.  See id. (discussing result). 
 120.  No. BER-L-10488-00, 2005 WL 427792 (N.J. Super. Ct. Jan. 18, 2005) (verdict summary). 
 121.  See id. (reciting facts). 
 122.  See id. (noting amount of damage award). 
 123.  No. 101996/02, 2005 WL 1817523 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 28, 2005) (verdict summary).  
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cigarettes.124 
H.  Pennsylvania 
Pennsylvania had only three reported punitive awards, none of which 
exceeded a single-digit ratio.  In Fromm v. Hershey Medical Center,125 the jury 
awarded the estate of a cardiac patient $168,400 in compensatory damages and 
$1,000,000 in punitive damages, a ratio of 6:1.  Fromm involved wrongful 
death and medical malpractice claims by the estate of a sixty-two-year-old man 
who was scheduled for cardiac surgery at Hershey Medical Center.  Upon 
meeting with the patient, the hospital’s financial counselor implied that it 
would not perform the surgery unless the patient could figure out a way to pay 
for it.  The patient, upset by this, left without scheduling the surgery and before 
he could reschedule, suffered a heart attack and died.  His estate sued, 
contending that the hospital denied care based on the patient’s inability to pay.  
Additionally, the cardiologists were sued for medical malpractice on the 
grounds that they should have done more to ensure Boltz had the surgery.  The 
hospital countered that the counselor never told Boltz that his surgery would 
not be scheduled until he could pay and that Boltz made the decision himself to 
leave the hospital.  Boltz’s estate asked for unspecified damages and also asked 
the jury to find that Hershey’s conduct was outrageous, warranting punitive 
damages.  The jury found the two cardiologists not liable but found Hersey 
hospital liable, and, citing intentional misconduct, awarded a large punitive 
award.126 
I.  Texas 
Texas had only six punitive damages awards in the 2005 Westlaw data, none 
of which involved a ratio that exceeded the single-digit guideline. 
V.  INSIGHTS ABOUT PROCESS AND LARGE RATIOS 
The data from our constructed Westlaw database add important insights to 
the understanding of punitive damages.  The BJS data indicate that pleadings 
involving punitive damages claims often do not result in punitive or 
compensatory damages.  The Westlaw data take us further by providing a 
sketch of the procedural factors that constrain and control punitive damages.  
Most particularly, they strongly suggest that judicial gate-keeping prevents 
many routine claims from ever being put to the jury in the first place, as judges 
apply common law and statutes to eliminate inappropriate claims.  The second 
                                                           
 124.  See id. (reciting facts). 
 125.  Nos. 1270s-1999 and 2510s-1999, 2005 WL 1705460 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. June 16, 2005) (verdict 
summary). 
 126.  See id.; 40 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1301.812-A(g) (setting range for punitive damages against physicians); 
Appendix A. 
VIDMARHOLMAN_LEAD_FORMATTED_6952884.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 8/4/2010  8:37 AM 
880 SUFFOLK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. XLIII:855 
insight is that when ratios exceed the single-digit guideline enunciated by the 
U.S. Supreme Court, it is arguable that the degree of reprehensibility is no 
different from TXO, in which the Supreme Court approved a high ratio because 
of the reprehensibility of the defendant’s behavior.  The data also hint at 
nuances in jury decisions, similar to those noted by Vidmar and Rose, in that 
while rendering a punitive damage award, juries rejected other claims made by 
the plaintiff.127 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
In Exxon Shipping v. Baker, the Supreme Court acknowledged as empirical 
fact that there is no significant evidence of runaway punitive awards, that there 
had been  no increase in awards over the past decades, and that the majority of 
punitive awards did not exceed a single digit ratio.  Despite these findings, the 
Court continued to be concerned about the exceptions to its stated guideline, 
referring to their stark unpredictability. 
The data in this article provide an update consistent with past empirical 
research.  However, we took our research beyond the extant literature by 
providing a profile of who asks for and who receives punitive damages, and 
provided a tentative outline of the factors that prevent recovery, including the 
burden of proving malicious intent accompanied by judicial supervision of 
statutory guidelines on punitive damages. 
A summary of the BJS data is helpful in putting the findings into 
perspective.  The 2005 Civil Justice Survey indicates that for the forty-six  
courts, representative of the 75 largest county courts in the United States, there 
were 6427 civil jury trials, and of these punitive damages were requested in 
pleadings 567 times, or 8.8% of cases.  In result, 131 trials involved the 
awarding of punitive damages—2% of all trials and 23% of cases in which the 
pleadings included a request for punitive damages.  Of the punitive award 
verdicts, only 14 cases exceeded the single-digit ratio guideline that has 
concerned the Supreme Court.  Additional research, using jury verdict 
reporters, produced very few (eleven) cases where the ratio of punitive to 
compensatory damages exceeded a single digit. 
The Supreme Court has concluded, in the past, that the appropriateness of 
awards is a qualitative judgment.  In BMW, the Court articulated the view that 
excessive punitive awards were acceptable when the ratio between punitive and 
compensatory damages was low, when the defendant’s conduct was 
particularly reprehensible, and when alternative state sanctions for similar 
misconduct are unavailable.  In examining the cases in the present article, the 
vast majority fit the first criterion: the ratio of punitive to compensatory 
                                                           
 127.  See generally Vidmar & Rose, supra note 32.  It is worth noting that neither database tells us about 
post-verdict appeals and settlements of the awards. Such information would permit an even more complete 
picture of the impact of punitive awards on defendants.  
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damages is low.  In the eleven cases in our Westlaw database with large 
punitive to compensatory ratios, there is often arguably clear evidence pointing 
to the reprehensibility of actions by the defendant.  In Goddard v. Holy Cross 
Catholic Cemetery, the jury evaluated the effect of the loss of a decedent’s 
remains and the conspiracy of the defendant in failing to report the loss to the 
plaintiff.  In Hampton v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., the jury 
considered the actions of the defendant (malicious prosecution, abuse of 
process, and contract fraud) reprehensible.  Similar actions by insurance 
companies in Radosevich v. Amco Insurance Co. and Griffin Dewatering Corp. 
v. Northern Insurance Co. of New York also resulted in large punitive awards.  
In Blount v. Stroud, the jury awarded punitive damages after testimony 
indicating that the plaintiff was fired for refusing to perjure herself in a prior 
lawsuit against the defendant. 
Other cases involved causes of action where there was not a clear substitute 
in state law.  In Hettick v. FedEx Corp., the failure to protect female employees 
from sexual harassment led to a large punitive award.  In Smith v. Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco Corp. and Rose v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 
the plaintiffs were awarded large punitive damages in cases involving the 
actions of tobacco companies. 
Consider again the Supreme Court’s conclusion in TXO, approving a 526:1 
punitive to compensatory damages ratio because the defendant engaged in 
“egregiously tortious conduct.”128  Our Westlaw data summaries of facts 
alleged in the trials resulting in verdicts exceeding the single digit guideline 
allows an arguable position that, like the Supreme Court in TXO, the juries 
found evidence that defendants had engaged in similar reprehensible behavior.  
We are left with a conclusion that empirical facts do not justify the Supreme 
Court’s continuing concern about the unpredictability and the ratios associated 














                                                           
 128.  TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 466 (1993).  
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APPENDIX:  A FULL SURVEY OF LEGAL AND MONETARY LIMITS ON 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES, BY STATE 
 
State Available?129 Legal Constraints on 
Punitive Damages130 
$ Cap?131 Monetary Limits on Punitive 
Damages132 
AL Yes Punitive damages are only 
available “where it is 
proven by clear and 
convincing evidence that 
the defendant consciously 
or deliberately engaged in 
oppression, fraud, 
wantonness, or malice with 
regard to the plaintiff.”133 
Yes Actual limits on punitive 
damages are three times 
compensatory damages or 
$500,000, whichever is 
greater.134  Wrongful death or 
intentional infliction of physical 
injury cases have no caps. 
AK Yes If the plaintiff 
demonstrates that the 
“defendant's conduct (1) 
was outrageous, including 
acts done with malice or 
bad motives; or (2) 
evidenced reckless 
indifference to the interest 
of another person” the fact 
finder can apply punitive 
damages.135 
Yes Punitive damages cannot 
exceed three times 
compensatory damages or 
$500,000.  The limit may be 
raised to the greater of up to 
four times compensatory 
damages or aggregate financial 
gain (maximum $7,000,000) if 
the defendant was “motivated 
by financial gain and the 
adverse consequences of the 
conduct were actually known 
by the defendant.”136 
AR Yes Punitive damages are only 
available if the defendant 
(1) was aware that conduct 
would result in “injury or 
damage and that he or she 
continued the conduct with 
malice or in reckless 
disregard of the 
Yes No more than the greater of 
$250,000 or three times the 
amount of compensatory 
damages (maximum 
$1,000,000).  No cap is applied 
if defendant meant to cause the 
harm and did cause the harm.138 
                                                           
 129.     Are punitive damages available in the state? 
 130.     What are the legal requirements, statutorily or by common law, governing the award of punitive 
damages?  
131.     Does the state have a cap in effect for punitive damages?  
132.     What are the monetary limits on punitive damages in the state?  
133.     ALA. CODE § 6-11-20(a) (2009).  
134.     See § 6-11-21.  The cap is different if defendant is a small business (i.e., with a net worth of 
less than $2,000,000)  In such a case, the cap is $50,000 or 10% of the business’s net worth.  Id.  
135.    See ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.020(b)(1)-(2) (2009).  
136.     Id. § 09.17.020 (f), (g). 
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consequences,” or (2) 
“intentionally pursued a 
course of conduct for the 
purpose of causing injury 
or damage.”137 
AZ Yes Punitive damages are 
available in Arizona if the 
defendant acted knowing 
that the course of conduct 
caused a substantial risk of 
harm,139 for both general 
and specific deterrence,140 
and in cases of “outrageous 
conduct.”141  
No The Arizona Constitution 
prohibits laws limiting amount 
of damages in personal injury 
and wrongful death cases:  “No 
law shall be enacted . . . 
limiting the amount of damages 
to be recovered for causing the 
death or injury of any other 
person.”142  
CO Yes Punitive damages are 
awarded in “circumstances 
of fraud, malice, or willful 
and wanton conduct.”143 
Yes Generally, punitive damages 
should not exceed 
compensatory damages, but the 
court may increase the punitive 
damages (to a maximum of 
three times the amount of actual 
damages) if the defendant has 
“continued the behavior,” 
“repeated the action,” or 
“further aggravated” the 
claimant’s damages through 
their “willful and wanton 
conduct.”144 
 
CA Yes “In an action for the breach 
of an obligation not arising 
from contract, where it is 
proven by clear and 
convincing evidence that 
No  
                                                                                                                                       
138.    Id. § 16-55-208. 
137.    ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-55-206 (2009). 
139.    Hawkins v. Allstate Ins. Co., 733 P.2d 1073, 1080 (Ariz. 1987). 
140.    See id.  
141.    Smith v. Chapman, 564 P.2d 900, 903 (Ariz. 1977); see also RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS, 
§ 908, cmt. b (1939). 
142.    ARIZ. CONS. ART. 2, § 31 (2010); see Smith v. Myers, 887 P.2d 541, 544 (Ariz. 1994). 
143.    COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-102(1)(a) (2008). 
144.    Id. § 13-21-102 (1)(a)(3).  Punitive damages are not allowed in any action against a health care 
professional that involves the approved use of drugs or clinically justified non-standard uses, within 
“prudent” health care standards, or written informed consent.  Id. § 13-64-302.5(5) (2001) (limiting 
punitive damage awards against health care professionals). 
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the defendant has been 
guilty of oppression, fraud, 
or malice, the plaintiff, in 
addition to the actual 
damages, may recover 
damages for the sake of 
example and by way of 
punishing the 
defendant.”145 
CT Yes The single purpose of 
punitive damages in 
Connecticut is to 
compensate the plaintiff for 
legal expenses.146 
Yes Punitive damages are limited to 
the actual cost of the litigation, 
including attorney's fees.147  
Punitive damages are capped at 
two times the compensatory 
damages in product liability 
cases and cases involving 
motor vehicle torts.148 
DE Yes Punitive damages are 
available in medical 
malpractice cases if the 
defendant caused an injury 
that was “maliciously 
intended or was the result 
of willful or wanton 
misconduct.”149 
No  
FL Yes The defendant’s conduct 
must be “intentional 
misconduct or gross 
negligence”150 for punitive 
damages; punitive damages 
are available even if 
compensatory damages are 
not awarded.151 
Yes Punitive damages are capped 
unless the plaintiff 
demonstrates a specific intent 
to harm.  The cap is the greater 
of three times compensatory 
damages or $500,000, unless a 
supervisor ratified the behavior, 
in which case the cap is the 
greater of four times 
                                                           
145.    CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294(a) (West 1997). 
146.    See Berry v. Loiseau, 614 A.2d 414, 433  (1992) (upholding limit on punitive damages).  The 
Connecticut Supreme Court noted that a “longstanding rule in Connecticut limit[ed] common law 
punitive damages to a party’s litigation costs,” and declined to overturn the “well established rule 
governing punitive damages awards.”  See id.   
147.    See generally Freeman v. Alamo Mgmt. Co., 607 A.2d 370 (Conn. 1992). 
148.    See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 14-295, 52-240(b) (2005)  
149.    DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 18, § 6855 (1999).  
150.    FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.72(2) (West 2005). 
151.    See id. § 768.72(2). 
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compensatory damages or 
$2,000,000.152 
 
GA Yes Punitive damages are 
allowable if the defendant 
showed “willful 
misconduct, malice, fraud, 
wantonness, oppression, or 
that entire want of care 
which would raise the 
presumption of conscious 
indifference to 
consequences.”153 
Yes Punitive damages may not 
exceed $250,000,154 except in 
cases of product liability155 and 
“if it is found that the defendant 
acted, or failed to act, with the 
specific intent to cause harm, or 
that the defendant acted or 
failed to act while under the 
influence of alcohol, drugs 
other than lawfully 
prescribed,”156 where there is 
no cap. 
HI Yes “The plaintiff must prove 
by clear and convincing 
evidence that the defendant 
has acted wantonly or 
oppressively or with such 
malice as implies a spirit of 
mischief or criminal 
indifference to civil 
obligations, or where there 
has been some willful 
misconduct or that entire 
want of care which would 
raise the presumption of a 




In medical malpractice, there is 
a limit on noneconomic 
damages for physical pain and 
suffering of $375,000.158 
IA Yes Punitive damages are 
available if the defendant 
engaged in conduct that 
constituted a “willful and 
wanton disregard for the 
No  
                                                           
152.    See id. §§ 768.725, 768.72(2). 
153.    GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(b) (West 2005). 
154.    Id. § 51-12-5.1(g). 
155.    Id. § 51-12-5.1(e)(1). 
156.    Id. § 51-12-5.1(f). 
157.    Masaki v. General Motors Corp., 780 P.2d 566, 579 (Haw. 1989) 
158.    See HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-8.7 ) (2009) (enumerating tort actions exempt from $375,000 cap, 
not including medical malpractice).  But see § 663-10.9(2) (2009) (stating $375,000 cap on damages for 
pain and suffering). 
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rights and safety of 
another.”159 
ID Yes The plaintiff is required to 
show the defendant 
engaged in “oppressive, 
fraudulent, malicious or 
outrageous conduct”160 
 Punitive damages may not 
exceed the greater of $250,000 
or three times the compensatory 
damages.161  
IL Yes Punitive damages may be 
awarded if the defendant is 
shown to act “with evil 
motive or with a reckless 
and outrageous 
indifference to a highly 
unreasonable risk of harm 
and with a conscious 
indifference to the rights 
and safety of others.”162 
No  
IN Yes Punitive damages may be 
awarded if the defendant 
“acted with the malice, 
fraud, gross negligence, or 
oppressiveness which was 
not the result of a mistake 
of fact or law, honest error 
or judgment, 
overzealousness, mere 
negligence, or other human 
failing.”163 
Yes Punitive damages may not 
exceed the greater of three 
times the compensatory award 
or $50,000.164 
KS Yes The plaintiff must 
demonstrate that the 
defendant “acted toward 
the plaintiff with willful 
conduct, wanton conduct, 
fraud or malice.”165 
Yes The punitive damages must not 
exceed the lesser of the 
defendant’s annual income, up 
to 50% of the net worth of the 
defendant, as determined by the 
court, or $5,000,000.166  
However, if the conduct of the 
                                                           
159. IOWA CODE ANN. § 668A.1(1)(a) (1998). 
160. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1604(1) (2004). 
161. Id. § 6-1604(3) (2004). 
162. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN 5/2-1115.05(b) (West 2009). 
163.    Nelson v. Jimison, 634 N.E.2d 509, 511 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994).  
164.    See IND. CODE ANN. § 34-51-3-4 (West 2009); see also USA Life One Ins. Co. of Ind. v. 
Nuckolls, 682 N.E.2d 534, 541 (Ind. 1997) (setting forth general requirements for recovery of punitive 
damages in Indiana). 
165.    KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3702(c) (2009).  
166.    Id. § 60-3702(e) 
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defendant results in a profit that 
exceeds these caps, the cap is 
raised to “1 1/2 times the 
amount of profit which the 
defendant gained or is expected 
to gain as a result of the 
defendant's misconduct.”167 
KY Yes Punitive damages are 
available when the 
defendant acted with 
“oppression, fraud or 
malice.”168 
No “The General Assembly shall 
have no power to limit the 
amount to be recovered for 
injuries resulting in death, or 
for injuries to person or 
property.”169 
LA No Punitive damages are 
prohibited by statute in 
Louisiana, yet there are 
exceptions for drunk 
driving,170 the unlawful 
interception of 
communications,171 and for 
those engaged in housing 
discrimination in violation 
of the Open Housing 
Act.172 
No  
MA No Punitive damages are 
prohibited by common 
law.173 
No  
ME Yes “[I]n order to recover 
punitive damages, a 
plaintiff must prove by 
clear and convincing 
evidence that the defendant 
acted with malice.”174 
No general 
limit 
$250,000 for wrongful death 
actions.175 
MD Yes “The purpose of punitive 
damages is not only to 
No general 
limit 
In medical malpractice cases, 
the award of noneconomic 
                                                           
167.    Id. § 60-3702(f). 
168.    KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.184(2) (West 2009).  
169.    KY. CONST. § 54 (2009). 
170.    LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art 2315.4 (2009). 
171.    LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:1312(A) (2009). 
172.    Id. § 51:2613(E). 
173.    See Caperci v. Huntoon, 397 F.2d 799, 801 (1st Cir. 1968); see also Dorothea C. Cadiff et al., 
Note, Punitive Tort Damages in New England, 41 B.U. L. REV. 389, 390 (1961). 
174.    Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353, 1354 (Me. 1985).  
175.    18 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit 18, § 2-804(b) (2009). 
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punish the defendant for 
egregiously bad conduct 
toward the plaintiff, but 
also to deter the defendant 
and others contemplating 
similar behavior.”176 
damages is limited to $500,000.  
There is a $350,000 limit on 
noneconomic damages in 
personal injury actions.177 
MI Yes In Michigan, punitive (or 
exemplary) damages are 
limited to “compensation 
for injury to feelings.”178 
 “The purpose of exemplary 
damages is not to punish the 
defendant, but to render the 
plaintiff whole.  When 
compensatory damages can 
make the injured party whole, 
exemplary damages must not 
be awarded.”179 
MN Yes The defendant must “show 
deliberate disregard for the 
rights and safety of 
others.”180 
No  
MO Yes "Punitive damages may be 
awarded for conduct that is 
outrageous, because of the 
defendant's evil motive or 
reckless indifference to the 
rights of others."181 
No  
MS Yes The defendant must have 
acted with “actual malice, 
gross negligence which 
evidences a willful, 
wanton, or reckless 
disregard for the safety of 
Yes Punitive damages are capped, 
with the caps relating to the net 
worth of the defendant.  If the 
defendant is worth more than 
$1,000,000,000, the damages 
are capped at $20,000,000.  For 
                                                           
176.    Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Garrett, 682 A.2d 1143, 1161 (Md. 1996); see also Bowden 
v. Caldor Inc., 710 A.2d 267, 276 (Md. 1998) (reaffirming punitive damages stated in Garrett); Stephen 
J. Shapiro, Punitive Damages in Maryland:  Reconciling Federal Law, State Law, and the Pattern Jury 
Instructions, 38 U. BALT. L. REV. 27, 33 (2007) (noting purpose of punitive damages in Maryland as 
stated in Garrett). 
177.    See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 11-108 (West 2004); Murphy v. Edmonds, 601 
A.2d 102, 116 (Md. 1992) (upholding cap on personal injury actions). 
178.    Jackson Printing Co., Inc. v. Mitan, 425 N.W.2d 791, 794 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988); see also 
Veselenak v Smith, 327 N.W.2d 261, 264 (Mich. 1982). 
179.    Jackson Printing Co., Inc., 425 N.W.2d at 794.  
180.    MINN. STAT. ANN § 549.20(1)(a) (2010).  
181.    RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(2) (1979); see also Altenhofen v. Fabricor, Inc., 81 
S.W.3d 578, 590 (Mo. 2002) (citing Burnett); Burnett v. Griffith, 769 S.W.2d 780, 787 (Mo. 1989) 
(laying out Missouri’s punitive damages standard). 
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others” or committed 
actual fraud.182  
a defendant worth more than 
$750,000,000 but less than 
$1,000,000,000, the cap is 
$15,000,000.  Defendants 
worth more than $500,000,000 
but less than $750,000,000 
cannot pay more than 
$5,000,000.  Those worth 
between $100,000,000 and 
$500,000,000 have a cap of 
$3,750,000.  A cap of 
$2,500,000 is in place for those 
worth more than $50,000,000 
but less than $100,000,000.  All 
other cases have a cap of 2% of 
the defendant’s net worth.183 
MT Yes Punitive damages can be 
awarded if the plaintiff 
demonstrates that the 
defendant is “guilty of 
actual fraud or actual 
malice.”184  
Yes Punitive damage awards may 
not exceed the lesser of 
$10,000,000 or 3% of a 
defendant's net worth.185 
NC Yes Punitive damages are 
available “to punish a 
defendant for egregiously 
wrongful acts and to deter 
the defendant and others 
from committing similar 
wrongful acts.”186 
Yes The punitive award may not 
exceed the greater of three 
times the compensatory award 
or $250,000.187 
ND Yes Exemplary damages may 
be awarded if the defendant 
is guilty of “oppression, 
fraud, or actual malice.”188   
Yes Punitive damages are capped at 
the greater of $250,000 or two 
times the compensatory 
damages.190 
                                                           
182.    MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-65(1)(a) (2009).  
183.    Id. § 11-1-65(3)(a)(i)-(vi). 
184.    MONT. CODE. ANN. § 27-1-221(1) (2009). 
185.    Id. § 27-1-220(3).  Actual malice exists “if the defendant has knowledge of facts or 
intentionally disregards facts that create a high probability of injury to the plaintiff.”  Id..  Furthermore, 
defendant must:  “deliberately proceed[] to act in conscious or intentional disregard of the high 
probability of injury to the plaintiff; or . . . deliberately proceed[] to act with indifference to the high 
probability of injury to the plaintiff.”  Id. § 27-1-221(2).  Actual fraud exists when a defendant:  “makes 
a representation with knowledge of its falsity; or . . . conceals a material fact with the purpose of 
depriving the plaintiff of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.”  Id. § 27-1-221(3). 
186.    N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1D-1 (2009). 
187.    Id. § 1D-25. 
188.    N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 32-03.2-11(1) (2009). 
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 Exemplary damages are 
awarded “for the sake of 
example and by way of 
punishing the 
defendant.”189 
NE No Prohibited by common law.  
“It has been a fundamental 
rule of law in this state that 
punitive, vindictive, or 
exemplary damages will 
not be allowed, and that the 
measure of recovery in all 
civil cases is compensation 
for the injury sustained.”191 
No  
NH No “No punitive damages shall 
be awarded in any action, 
unless otherwise provided 
by statute.”192 
No  
NJ Yes Punitive damages are 
available if the 
“defendant's acts or 
omissions, and such acts or 
omissions were actuated by 
actual malice or 
accompanied by a wanton 
and willful disregard of 
persons who foreseeably 
might be harmed by those 
acts or omissions.”193 
Yes The cap on punitive damages is 
the greater of five times the 
compensatory damages or 
$350,000.194  Hate crimes, 
discrimination, AIDS testing 
disclosure, sex abuse, and 
drunk drivers are excluded 
from the cap.195 
                                                                                                                                       
190.    Id. § 32-03.2-11(4). 
189.    Id. § 32-03.2-11(1).  
191.    See Abel v. Conover, 104 N.W.2d 684, 688 (Neb. 1960) (calling prohibition on punitive 
damages “fundamental rule of law” in Nebraska); see also Wilfong v. Omaha & Council Bluffs St. Ry. 
Co., 262 N.W. 537, 540 (Neb. 1935) (holding damages for torts limited to compensation for actual 
injury sustained); Bee Pub. Co. v. World Pub. Co., 82 N.W. 28, 29 (Neb. 1900) (stating measure of 
recovery compensation for injury sustained); Atkins v. Gladwish, 41 N.W.347, 350 (Neb. 1889) 
(acknowledging rule limiting recovery to damage for injury sustained).  See generally Boyer v. Barr, 8 
Neb. 68 (Neb. 1878) (calling question of punitives “tabulraza”).  
192.    N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:16 (2010).  
193.    N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.12(4)(a) (2009).  
194.    See id. § 2A:15-5.14. 
195.    See id. § 2A:15-5.14(c) (indicating exceptions to punitive damage cap).   
 
The provisions of subsection b. of this section shall not apply to causes of action brought 
pursuant to P.L.1993, c.137 (C.2A:53A-21 et seq.), P.L.1945, c.169 (C.10:5-1 et seq.), 
P.L.1989, c.303 (C.26:5C-5 et seq.), P.L.1992, c.109 (C.2A:61B-1) or P.L.1986, c.105, 
(C.34:19-1 et seq.), or in cases in which a defendant has been convicted pursuant to 
VIDMARHOLMAN_LEAD_FORMATTED_6952884.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 8/4/2010  8:37 AM 
2010] PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN STATE COURTS IN 2005: A NEW AUDIT 891 
NM Yes “Punitive or exemplary 
damages may be awarded 
only when the conduct of 
the wrongdoer may be said 
to be maliciously 
intentional, fraudulent, 
oppressive, or committed 
recklessly or with a wanton 
disregard of the 
plaintiff[’s] rights.”196 
No  
NV Yes Punitive damages can be 
awarded when the 
defendant is “guilty of 
oppression, fraud, or 
malice.”197 
Yes Damages are capped at three 
times the compensatory 
damages if the compensatory 
damages are more than 
$100,000 and $300,000 if the 
compensatory damages are less 
than $100,000.198  Cases 
involving product liability, 
insurance fraud, toxic waste, 
housing discrimination, and 
defamation are not subject to 
these caps.199 
NY Yes The defendant must act 
with “intentional or 
deliberate wrongdoing, 
aggravating or outrageous 
circumstances, fraudulent 
or evil motive, or 
conscious act in willful and 
wanton disregard of 
another's rights.”200 
No  
OH Yes Punitive damages are No  
                                                                                                                                       
N.J.S.2C:11-3, N.J.S.2C:11-4, R.S.39:4-50 or section 2 of P.L.1981, c.512 (C.39:4-50.4a) or 
the equivalent under the laws of any other jurisdiction. 
 
Id. § 2A: 15-5.14(c). 
196.    Loucks v. Albuquerque Nat. Bank, 418 P.2d 191, 199 (N.M. 1966). 
197.    NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42.005(1) (2009).  
198.    Id. §§ 42.005(1)(a)-(b). 
199.    Id. § 42.005(2).  
200.    Pearlman v. Friedman Alpren & Green LLP, 750 N.Y.S.2d 869, 869 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002) 
(holding punitive damages unwarranted absent deliberate wrongdoing,, evil motive, etc.); see also Don 
Buchwald & Assocs., Inc. v. Rich, 723 N.Y.S.2d 8, 8 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001) (allowing punitive 
damages only for intentional wrongdoing, outrageous fraud, or willful and wanton acts); Le Mistral, Inc. 
v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 402 N.Y.S.2d 815, 817(N.Y. App. Div. 1978) (stating exemplary damages 
only allowed when wrong aggravated by evil, willful, intentional or reckless indifference).  
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available if the defendant 
acted with, or authorized 
acts of, malice or 
aggravated fraud.201 
OK Yes An award of punitive 
damages depends on the 
degree to which the 
defendant:  engaged in 
behavior that was a hazard 
to the public; profited from 
the behavior, involved 
concealment of the acts; 
was aware of the acts; the 
number of employees 
involved in the act (for 
corporations); and the 
financial worth of the 
defendant.202 
Yes If the defendant acted with 
reckless disregard, punitive 
damages are capped at the 
greater of $100,000 or actual 
damages.203  In cases where the 
defendant acted with malice, 
the cap is the greatest of 
$500,000, two times the 
compensatory damages, or the 
financial benefit of the behavior 
to the defendant.204  If it is 
found beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant acted 
in a manner that threatened a 
human life, there is no cap.205 
OR Yes Punitive damages are 
available when it is proven 
by clear and convincing 
evidence that the defendant 
acted with malice or “a 
reckless and outrageous 
indifference to a highly 
unreasonable risk of harm 
and has acted with a 
conscious indifference to 
the health, safety and 
welfare of others.”206 
No general 
limits 
Punitive damages are 
unavailable in medical 
malpractice cases.207  
PA Yes Punitive damages are 
available when the 
defendant engages in 
outrageous conduct, or has 
an “evil motive or [a] 
Yes Punitive damages are capped at 
200% of the compensatory 
damages, unless the defendant 
is guilty of intentional 
misconduct, which has no cap.  
                                                           
201.    OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.18 (2010).  
202.    OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23 § 9.1(A) (2008). 
203.    Id. § 9.1(B). 
204.    Id. § 9.1(C). 
205.    Id. § 9.1(D). 
206.    OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31.730 (West 2009). 
207.    Id. § 31.740. 
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reckless indifference to the 
rights of others.”208 
Punitive damages cannot be 
less than $100,000, unless the 
compensatory damages are less 
than $100,000.209 
RI Yes “[P]unitive damages are 
proper only in situations in 
which the defendant's 
actions are so willful, 
reckless, or wicked that 
they amount to 
criminality.”210 
No  
SC Yes The defendant must engage 
in conduct demonstrating 
“malice, ill will, a 
conscious indifference to 
the rights of others, or a 
reckless disregard thereof” 
for punitive damages to be 
awarded.211 
No  
SD Yes Punitive damages are 
available when the 
defendant engages in 
“oppression, fraud, or 
malice, actual or presumed, 
or in any case of wrongful 
injury to animals, being 
subjects of property, 
committed intentionally or 
by willful and wanton 
misconduct, in disregard of 
humanity.” 212 
No  
TN Yes Punitive damages are 
awarded “only if [the 
court] finds a defendant has 
acted either (1) 
No  
                                                           
208.    Martin v. Johns-Manville Corp., 494 A.2d 1088, 1096 (Pa. 1985) (stating Pennsylvania 
guidelines for awarding punitive damages).  
209.    40 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1301.812-A(g) (1999). 
210.    Greater Providence Deposit Corp. v. Jenison, 485 A.2d 1242, 1244 (R.I. 1984) (illustrating use 
of punitive damages in punishing offender and deterring future conduct, not compensating plaintiff); see 
also Serra v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 463 A.2d 142, 151 (R.I. 1983) (upholding principle that punitive 
damages only for willful, reckless, or wicked actions).  
211.    King v. Allstate Insurance Co., 251 S.E.2d 194, 263 (S.C. 1979); see also S.C. CODE ANN. § 
15-33-135 (2009). 
212.    S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-3-2 (2009). 
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intentionally, (2) 
fraudulently, (3) 
maliciously, or (4) 
recklessly . . . .”213 
TX Yes Punitive damages are 
available if the defendant 
engaged in fraud, malice, 
or gross negligence.214 
Yes The cap is the greater of:  the 
award for non-economic 
damages up to $750,000 plus 
twice the award for economic 
damages, or $200,000.215 
UT Yes If the defendant engaged in 
“willful and malicious or 
intentionally fraudulent 
conduct, or conduct that 
manifests a knowing and 
reckless indifference 
toward, and a disregard of, 
the rights of others,” 
punitive damages may be 
awarded.216 
No  
VA Yes Punitive damages are 
available when the 
defendant engages in 
“negligence which is so 
willful or wanton as to 
evince a conscious 
disregard of the rights of 
others, as well as malicious 
conduct, will support an 
award of punitive damages 
. . . .”217 
Yes Maximum cap of $ 350,000.218 
VT Yes Punitive damages are 
allowed when the 
defendant engages in 
“conduct manifesting 
personal ill will, 
evidencing insult or 
No  
                                                           
213.    See Hodges v. S.C. Toof & Co., 833 S.W.2d 896, 901 (Tenn. 1992) (setting out Tennessee 
punitive damages rule).  
214.    See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.003 (a)(1)-(3) (2008).  
215.    See id. § 41.008(b)(1)-(2) (2009). 
216.    UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-8-201(b) (2008).  
217.    Booth v. Robertson, 374 S.E.2d 1, 3 (Va. 1988) (quoting King v. Commonwealth, 231 S.E.2d 
312, 316 (Va. 1977)).  
218.    VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-38.1 (2007). 
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oppression, or showing a 
reckless or wanton 
disregard of [a party's] 
rights.”219 
WA No Punitive damages are not 
permitted.220 
No  
WI Yes Damages are allowed when 
the defendant’s behavior is 
“willful, wanton or 
reckless.”221 
No  
WV Yes Punitive damages are 
awarded in circumstances 
where the defendant 
engaged in malice, 
oppression, wanton, 
willful, reckless conduct, 
or criminal indifference.222 
No “[T]here can be no 
mathematical bright line 
relationship between punitive 
damages and compensatory 
damages.”223 
WY Yes “[P]unitive damages are 
awarded to punish the 
defendant and deter others 
from such conduct in the 
future.”224 
No “No law shall be enacted 
limiting the amount of damages 
to be recovered for causing the 










                                                           
219.    Crump v. P & C Food Markets, Inc., 576 A.2d 441, 449 (Vt. 1990).  
220.    See Spokane Truck & Dray Co. v. Hoefer, 25 P. 1072, 1073 (Wash. 1891) (noting doctrine of 
punitive damages rests on unstable basis).  
221.    WIS. STAT. § 895.037(3)(b) (2006).  The Wisconsin Supreme Court has since set forth the 
standard that punitive damages can be awarded if the plaintiff acts purposefully disregard the plaintiff’s 
rights, or engages in the conduct despite awareness that his or her acts will result in the plaintiff’s rights 
being disregarded.  See generally Wischer v. Mitsubishi Heavy Ind. America, 694 N.W.2d 320 (Wis. 
2005); Strenke v. Hogner, 694 N.W.2d 296 (Wis. 2005) (discussing Wisconsin punitive damages 
statute). 
222.    See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 419 S.E.2d 870, 887 (W. Va. 1992) (noting 
Haslip guidelines); Wells v. Smith, 297 S.E.2d 872, 878-81 (W. Va. 1982) (discussing nature of punitive 
damage awards). 
223.    TXO, 419 S.E.2d at 887. 
224.    See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Shrader, 882 P.2d 813, 837 (Wyo. 1994) (explaining 
theory of punitive damages).  
225.    WYO. CONST. ART. 10 § 4 (2008). 
